Data and intellectual property
Retention, provider training, contractor access, deletion, licences, copyright, transcripts and metadata.
INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE · AI SECURITY · DATA GOVERNANCE
Comparative evidence for assessing external AI models, research platforms, hosting providers, public code, automation services and third-party connections. Updated 10 November 2026. Cases include AI-specific systems and wider technology dependencies that an AI system may use.
Interpretation: An incident demonstrates a type of failure, not that every employee or service in the named organisation acts maliciously. Distinguish confirmed incidents, research findings, allegations and regulatory conclusions. Historic security failures do not establish present insecurity; an absence of known incidents is not proof of safety. Nationality or jurisdiction alone is not evidence of intent.
Retention, provider training, contractor access, deletion, licences, copyright, transcripts and metadata.
Access controls, API keys, dependencies, update integrity, vulnerabilities, prompt injection, model execution and incident response.
Applicable law, processing location, lawful disclosure requirements, ownership changes, service continuity and documented external dependencies.
Unfair or misleading outputs, surveillance, personal-data misuse, concentration of infrastructure and inadequate avenues to challenge decisions.
20 case studies displayed
| No. | Year | Case study | Evidence status | What occurred or was established | Application to safer AI development | Primary/authoritative source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2023 | OpenAI ChatGPT history and payment-data exposure | Confirmed software defect | An open-source library bug could reveal other users’ chat titles and limited payment-related details during a defined period. | Isolation tests; minimise confidential prompts; verify provider incident reporting. | Evidence and report |
| 2 | 2025 | OpenAI–Mixpanel analytics incident | Confirmed third-party incident | OpenAI reported that Mixpanel systems were accessed and limited identifying analytics data exported; OpenAI said prompts, chat content and API keys were not compromised. | Audit third-party analytics, identifiers and subprocessors separately from core AI infrastructure. | Evidence and report |
| 3 | 2024 | Hugging Face Spaces secrets incident | Confirmed platform incident | Hugging Face detected unauthorised Spaces access and suspected some stored secrets had been accessed; it rotated tokens and introduced stronger controls. | Use narrowly scoped, disposable tokens; minimise hosted secrets; log key rotations. | Evidence and report |
| 4 | 2023 | Microsoft AI repository storage exposure | Researcher-verified exposure | Security researchers found an over-permissive Azure share token exposing access to approximately 38 TB of additional private storage; the token was revoked. | Never publish broad cloud access tokens with models or data; segregate public and private storage. | Evidence and report |
| 5 | 2025 | DeepSeek publicly accessible database | Researcher-disclosed exposure | Security researchers identified a database accessible without authentication containing logs, chat histories and sensitive fields; exposure does not establish that unknown parties downloaded them. | Require network isolation, authenticated database access, and documented retention. | Evidence and report |
| 6 | 2023 | Samsung confidential material submitted to external AI | Reported organisational data handling incident | News reports described employees placing sensitive code into an external AI service and the organisation responding with usage restrictions. | Classify information before submitting to hosted AI; use approved local or contracted environments. | Evidence and report |
| 7 | 2022 | PyTorch nightly package compromise | Confirmed dependency compromise | A malicious torchtriton package affected specified PyTorch nightly installations on Linux during December 2022; stable packages were not affected. | Pin dependencies, verify release provenance and minimise build-machine permissions. | Evidence and report |
| 8 | 2024 | XZ Utils maintenance-chain backdoor | Confirmed malicious software supply chain | An intentionally inserted backdoor appeared in affected xz releases; the operational impact depends on distribution and environment. | Review maintainership, dependency changes and signed build artifacts, not only licences. | Evidence and report |
| 9 | 2025 | tj-actions/changed-files workflow compromise | Confirmed CI/CD supply-chain compromise | Compromised GitHub Actions versions exposed the risk of leaking workflow secrets to logs; NHS England published an advisory. | Pin reviewed action commits, restrict secrets in public CI and monitor workflow changes. | Evidence and report |
| 10 | 2023 | CircleCI employee-session compromise and token exposure | Confirmed service provider intrusion | An attacker compromised an engineer’s session and extracted some customer environment variables, keys and tokens, prompting key rotations. | Treat CI providers as privileged processors; limit secrets and rotate after credible incidents. | Evidence and report |
| 11 | 2020 | SolarWinds Orion update compromise | Confirmed supply-chain intrusion | A compromised software update was used in an extensive intrusion campaign affecting government and commercial environments; subsequent targeting affected a subset of users. | Verify software update chains, environment segregation and privileged-service access. | Evidence and report |
| 12 | 2023 | 3CX cascading supply-chain incident | Confirmed vendor intrusion and distribution | Mandiant traced compromise of a communications application through a previously compromised software dependency, with malicious desktop-app distribution. | Check dependency provenance, vendor incident response and endpoint isolation. | Evidence and report |
| 13 | 2024 | Snowflake customer account compromise campaign | Confirmed customer-account attacks | Mandiant reported attackers using stolen customer credentials against multiple Snowflake customer environments, with approximately 165 potentially exposed organisations notified. | Enforce MFA, least-privilege queries, access monitoring and short-lived service credentials. | Evidence and report |
| 14 | 2023 | Okta support-system file and session exposure | Confirmed support-system intrusion | An attacker accessed support files for 134 customers and could hijack a small number of sessions; follow-up findings identified wider support-user contact-data exposure. | Scrub session data from support bundles; isolate vendor-support access and require session revocation. | Evidence and report |
| 15 | 2022 | LastPass backup-data breach | Confirmed provider intrusion and regulatory action | Attackers accessed some archived customer information; UK regulators later found inadequate protections for sensitive personal information. Encryption limited but did not eliminate the risks. | Minimise concentrated sensitive data, independently review encryption and recovery processes. | Evidence and report |
| 16 | 2023 | MOVEit Transfer exploited vulnerability | Confirmed mass third-party vulnerability | An exploited file-transfer vulnerability was associated with theft of customer and employee data from multiple organisations and their supply chains. | Inventory managed-transfer dependencies and vendor exposure; patch and independently validate. | Evidence and report |
| 17 | 2023 | 23andMe account compromise and related-person exposure | Regulator-confirmed breach | Credential-stuffing attacks exposed account and related-person data; a 2025 UK–Canada investigation found security safeguards inadequate. | Protect sensitive relational datasets; MFA, anomaly detection and limits on downstream sharing. | Evidence and report |
| 18 | 2015–2017 | Royal Free NHS and DeepMind health-data sharing review | Regulator-confirmed governance deficiency, not a breach finding | UK oversight examined whether the data-sharing arrangement, transparency and purpose limitation adequately protected patient information. | Confirm lawful purpose, necessity, minimisation, disclosure and independent oversight before AI partnerships. | Evidence and report |
| 19 | 2024 | Change Healthcare ransomware and services disruption | Confirmed incident and regulator investigation | A ransomware event disrupted healthcare and billing operations and triggered an investigation of privacy/security obligations. | Require exit and continuity planning for concentrated service providers and critical infrastructure. | Evidence and report |
| 20 | 2023 | Microsoft Storm-0558 cloud email intrusion | Independent federal review of a security incident | A government review described forged authentication tokens used to access enterprise email accounts and gaps in the provider’s explanation of key exposure. | Evaluate independent incident investigations, authentication boundaries and national-security exposure. | Evidence and report |
Case-study inclusion reflects transferable technical or governance lessons, not a ranking of current provider risk. Do not use these incidents to infer motives of present staff, national groups or unrelated services.
Record processing and backup locations, retention windows, deletion controls, permitted model-training uses, subprocessors, support access, lawful requests and the rights of people whose data is included. Obtain a documented legal basis where personal data is processed.
Record the software and model licence, repository source and maintainer, pinned release, software bill of materials where applicable, isolation of secrets, authentication method, audit events, vulnerability reporting and incident notification terms. Local open-source software still requires review.
Record public corporate ownership, hosting and processing jurisdictions, relevant legal obligations, known material service restrictions and available exit paths. Assess actual policy and technical evidence, not assumptions about ethnicity, citizenship or personal political beliefs.
Test source accuracy, hallucination, independent corroboration, model-generated misinformation, prompt injection, improper retrieval, idea attribution and the reliability of recorded corrections. Keep human approval for consequential communications or publishing.
For each trial record who approved it, what data classes may be sent, what was tested, what failed, total expected cost, revocation steps and the next review date. A free tier is a pricing decision, not a security certification.
Return to the searchable AI tool inventory · Public-interest AI programme · Productivity log